no code implementations • 20 Oct 2023 • Shawn Shan, Wenxin Ding, Josephine Passananti, Stanley Wu, Haitao Zheng, Ben Y. Zhao
In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models.
1 code implementation • 1 Jun 2023 • John Abascal, Stanley Wu, Alina Oprea, Jonathan Ullman
In this work we propose a new membership-inference threat model where the adversary only has access to the finetuned model and would like to infer the membership of the pretraining data.
2 code implementations • 12 May 2022 • Matthew Jagielski, Stanley Wu, Alina Oprea, Jonathan Ullman, Roxana Geambasu
Our results on four public datasets show that our attacks are effective at using update information to give the adversary a significant advantage over attacks on standalone models, but also compared to a prior MI attack that takes advantage of model updates in a related machine-unlearning setting.