no code implementations • 24 Feb 2024 • Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers
In this context, we find that the optimal contract assigns a higher weight to the agent whose success it values more, irrespective of the heterogeneity in the agents' cost parameters.
no code implementations • 26 Apr 2023 • Sumit Goel, Amit Goyal
For ratio-form and difference-form contests that admit pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we find that the effort of both players is monotone decreasing in the probability that ties are broken in favor of the stronger player.
no code implementations • 9 Feb 2022 • Federico Echenique, Sumit Goel, SangMok Lee
We study stable allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods.
no code implementations • 2 Jul 2020 • Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers
Using this characterization, we find that in the case of two projects, the optimal mechanism under both objectives takes the form of a simple cutoff mechanism.
