Revisiting the Threat Space for Vision-based Keystroke Inference Attacks

12 Sep 2020  ·  John Lim, True Price, Fabian Monrose, Jan-Michael Frahm ·

A vision-based keystroke inference attack is a side-channel attack in which an attacker uses an optical device to record users on their mobile devices and infer their keystrokes. The threat space for these attacks has been studied in the past, but we argue that the defining characteristics for this threat space, namely the strength of the attacker, are outdated. Previous works do not study adversaries with vision systems that have been trained with deep neural networks because these models require large amounts of training data and curating such a dataset is expensive. To address this, we create a large-scale synthetic dataset to simulate the attack scenario for a keystroke inference attack. We show that first pre-training on synthetic data, followed by adopting transfer learning techniques on real-life data, increases the performance of our deep learning models. This indicates that these models are able to learn rich, meaningful representations from our synthetic data and that training on the synthetic data can help overcome the issue of having small, real-life datasets for vision-based key stroke inference attacks. For this work, we focus on single keypress classification where the input is a frame of a keypress and the output is a predicted key. We are able to get an accuracy of 95.6% after pre-training a CNN on our synthetic data and training on a small set of real-life data in an adversarial domain adaptation framework. Source Code for Simulator:

PDF Abstract


Introduced in the Paper:

Synthetic Keystroke

Used in the Paper:

ImageNet COCO

Results from the Paper

  Submit results from this paper to get state-of-the-art GitHub badges and help the community compare results to other papers.


No methods listed for this paper. Add relevant methods here