The Effect of Biased Communications On Both Trusting and Suspicious Voters

11 Jun 2013William W. CohenDavid P. RedlawskDouglas Pierce

In recent studies of political decision-making, apparently anomalous behavior has been observed on the part of voters, in which negative information about a candidate strengthens, rather than weakens, a prior positive opinion about the candidate. This behavior appears to run counter to rational models of decision making, and it is sometimes interpreted as evidence of non-rational "motivated reasoning"... (read more)

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