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Found 9 papers, 0 papers with code
Equity Pay In Networked Teams
A group of agents each exert effort to produce a joint output, with the complementarities between their efforts represented by a (weighted) network.
On the Difficulty of Characterizing Network Formation with Endogenous Behavior
114:1-10) studies a model in which a network is strategically formed and then agents play a linear best-response investment game in it.
Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility
Complex organizations accomplish tasks through many steps of collaboration among workers.
Taxes and Market Power: A Principal Components Approach
The Pigouvian leverage of the system -- the gain in consumer surplus achievable by an optimal tax scheme -- depends only on the dispersion of the eigenvalues of the matrix of strategic interactions.
A Network Approach to Public Goods: A Short Summary
Suppose agents can exert costly effort that creates nonrival, heterogeneous benefits for each other.
Games on Endogenous Networks
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e. g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners.
Expectations, Networks, and Conventions
In coordination games and speculative over-the-counter financial markets, solutions depend on higher-order average expectations: agents' expectations about what counterparties, on average, expect their counterparties to think, etc.
Supply Network Formation and Fragility
We show that supply networks of intermediate productivity are fragile in equilibrium, even though this is always inefficient.
Learning from Neighbors about a Changing State
The dynamics thus parallel those of the tractable DeGroot model of learning in networks, but arise as an equilibrium outcome rather than a behavioral assumption.
