Search Results for author:
Found 7 papers, 0 papers with code
Proportionally Representative Clustering
We propose a new axiom ``proportional representation fairness'' (PRF) that is designed for clustering problems where the selection of centroids reflects the distribution of data points and how tightly they are clustered together.
Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Facility Location
We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness.
A characterization of proportionally representative committees
A well-known axiom for proportional representation is Proportionality of Solid Coalitions (PSC).
Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives
From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard.
The Capacity Constrained Facility Location problem
The capacity constrained setting leads to a new strategic environment where a facility serves a subset of the population, which is endogenously determined by the ex-post Nash equilibrium of an induced subgame and is not directly controlled by the mechanism designer.
Representing the Insincere: Strategically Robust Proportional Representation
Furthermore, we prove a limit on `how strategically robust' a PR-based voting rule can be; we show that there is no PR-based voting rule which ensures that every equilibrium satisfies PR.
Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms
We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings.
