no code implementations • 12 Nov 2021 • David Umsonst, Serkan Sarıtaş, György Dán, Henrik Sandberg
We present a moving target defense strategy to reduce the impact of stealthy sensor attacks on feedback systems.
no code implementations • 5 Nov 2021 • David Umsonst, Henrik Sandberg
In this work, we evaluate theoretical results on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup.
1 code implementation • 25 May 2021 • David Umsonst, Justin Ruths, Henrik Sandberg
A detector threshold that provides an acceptable false alarm rate is equivalent to a specific quantile of the detector output distribution.
no code implementations • 8 Jan 2020 • David Umsonst, Henrik Sandberg
We derive conditions for when the attacker is able to perfectly estimate the controller's state.