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Found 4 papers, 0 papers with code
Robust Auction Design with Support Information
With "high" support information, SPAs are strictly suboptimal, and an optimal mechanism belongs to a class of mechanisms we introduce, which we call pooling auctions (POOL); whenever the highest value is above a threshold, the mechanism still allocates to the highest bidder, but otherwise the mechanism allocates to a uniformly random buyer, i. e., pools low types.
Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious.
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an indivisible item to $n$ buyers such that the buyers' valuations are drawn from a joint distribution that is unknown to both the buyers and the seller; buyers do not need to form beliefs about competitors, and the seller assumes the distribution is adversarially chosen from a specified class.
Social Learning under Platform Influence: Consensus and Persistent Disagreement
In this paper, we introduce an opinion dynamics model where agents are connected in a social network, and update their opinions based on their neighbors' opinions and on the content shown to them by the platform.
