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Found 4 papers, 0 papers with code
Parameterized Intractability for Multi-Winner Election under the Chamberlin-Courant Rule and the Monroe Rule
Answering an open question by Betzler et al. [Betzler et al., JAIR'13], we resolve the parameterized complexity of the multi-winner determination problem under two famous representation voting rules: the Chamberlin-Courant (in short CC) rule [Chamberlin and Courant, APSR'83] and the Monroe rule [Monroe, APSR'95].
Participatory Budgeting with Donations and Diversity Constraints
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a democratic process where citizens jointly decide on how to allocate public funds to indivisible projects.
Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces is Hard
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as introduced by Knuth [12].
Computer Science and Game Theory
Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter.
