no code implementations • 21 Jan 2024 • Moshe Babaioff, Amitai Frey, Noam Nisan
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance.
no code implementations • 14 Dec 2021 • Yoav Kolumbus, Noam Nisan
The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading.
no code implementations • 22 Oct 2021 • Yoav Kolumbus, Noam Nisan
We analyze a scenario in which software agents implemented as regret-minimizing algorithms engage in a repeated auction on behalf of their users.
no code implementations • 26 Jul 2021 • Moshe Babaioff, Ruty Mundel, Noam Nisan
We observe that this social inefficiency may be unbounded, and study whether alternative tax structures may lead to milder losses in the worst case, i. e. to a lower price of anarchy.
1 code implementation • 25 Apr 2013 • Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
We study scenarios where multiple sellers of a homogeneous good compete on prices, where each seller can only sell to some subset of the buyers.
Computer Science and Game Theory J.4; F.2.2
