1 code implementation • 16 May 2022 • Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Stanisław Szufa
We use the ``map of elections'' approach of Szufa et al. (AAMAS-2020) to analyze several well-known vote distributions.
no code implementations • 19 Apr 2021 • Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Nimrod Talmon
We study the problem of bribery in multiwinner elections, for the case where the voters cast approval ballots (i. e., sets of candidates they approve) and the bribery actions are limited to: adding an approval to a vote, deleting an approval from a vote, or moving an approval within a vote from one candidate to the other.
no code implementations • 3 Oct 2018 • Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Piotr Faliszewski
From the positive perspective we provide an efficient algorithm for solving the problem parameterized by the combined parameter the number of candidates and the maximum bribery price (alternatively the number of different bribery prices).
no code implementations • 12 Sep 2018 • Piotr Faliszewski, Nimrod Talmon
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties.
no code implementations • 7 Jan 2016 • Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon
Given an election, a preferred candidate p, and a budget, the SHIFT BRIBERY problem asks whether p can win the election after shifting p higher in some voters' preference orders.
no code implementations • 28 Nov 2014 • Jiehua Chen, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Nimrod Talmon
We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter.
no code implementations • 13 Feb 2014 • Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Jerome Lang
We consider the following problem: There is a set of items (e. g., movies) and a group of agents (e. g., passengers on a plane); each agent has some intrinsic utility for each of the items.
no code implementations • 14 Dec 2013 • Piotr Skowron, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii Slinko
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their representatives.