no code implementations • 2 May 2021 • Sixie Yu, David Kempe, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good.
1 code implementation • 12 Aug 2020 • Sixie Yu, Leonardo Torres, Scott Alfeld, Tina Eliassi-Rad, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
However, in many applications, such as targeted vulnerability assessment or clinical therapies, one aspires to affect a targeted subset of a network, while limiting the impact on the rest.
Social and Information Networks Physics and Society
no code implementations • 25 Feb 2020 • David Kempe, Sixie Yu, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors.
Computer Science and Game Theory Multiagent Systems
no code implementations • 13 Nov 2019 • Sixie Yu, Kai Zhou, P. Jeffrey Brantingham, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Public goods games study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good and their behaviors in equilibria.
Computer Science and Game Theory
no code implementations • 31 Jan 2019 • Sixie Yu, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
An important problem in networked systems is detection and removal of suspected malicious nodes.
1 code implementation • 30 Dec 2018 • Sixie Yu, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
In reality, detection is always imperfect, and the decision about which potentially malicious nodes to remove must trade off false positives (erroneously removing benign nodes) and false negatives (mistakenly failing to remove malicious nodes).
1 code implementation • ICML 2018 • Liang Tong, Sixie Yu, Scott Alfeld, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
We present an algorithm for computing this equilibrium, and show through extensive experiments that equilibrium models are significantly more robust than conventional regularized linear regression.