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Found 12 papers, 1 papers with code
The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making
Fairness is one of the most desirable societal principles in collective decision-making.
Graphical House Allocation
The classical house allocation problem involves assigning $n$ houses (or items) to $n$ agents according to their preferences.
Surprisingly Popular Voting Recovers Rankings, Surprisingly!
A clever recent approach, \emph{surprisingly popular voting}, elicits additional information from the individuals, namely their \emph{prediction} of other individuals' votes, and provably recovers the ground truth even when experts are in minority.
Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind
The maximin share (MMS) guarantee is a desirable fairness notion for allocating indivisible goods.
Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences
Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods.
Fairness
Computer Science and Game Theory
Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
We show that the optimal manipulation strategy for an accomplice comprises of promoting exactly one woman in his true list (i. e., an inconspicuous manipulation).
Computer Science and Game Theory
Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings
We study the classical problem of matching $n$ agents to $n$ objects, where the agents have ranked preferences over the objects.
The Crawler: Three Equivalence Results for Object (Re)allocation Problems when Preferences Are Single-peaked
A natural "dual" rule can be defined by proceeding in the reverse order.
An agent-based model of an endangered population of the Arctic fox from Mednyi Island
Artificial Intelligence techniques such as agent-based modeling and probabilistic reasoning have shown promise in modeling complex biological systems and testing ecological hypotheses through simulation.
Investigating the Characteristics of One-Sided Matching Mechanisms Under Various Preferences and Risk Attitudes
One-sided matching mechanisms are fundamental for assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of self-interested agents when monetary transfers are not allowed.
Random Serial Dictatorship versus Probabilistic Serial Rule: A Tale of Two Random Mechanisms
For assignment problems where agents, specifying ordinal preferences, are allocated indivisible objects, two widely studied randomized mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS).
A Coordinated MDP Approach to Multi-Agent Planning for Resource Allocation, with Applications to Healthcare
This paper considers a novel approach to scalable multiagent resource allocation in dynamic settings.
