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Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients
Then, the clients strategically select which of the opened facilities in their neighborhood to patronize.
Temporal Network Creation Games
However, many real-world networks are not shaped by a central designer but instead they emerge and evolve by the interaction of many strategic agents.
Schelling Games with Continuous Types
We focus on segregation caused by non-categorical attributes, such as household income or position in a political left-right spectrum.
Strategic Resource Selection with Homophilic Agents
We depart from this very general setting by proposing Resource Selection Games with heterogeneous agents that strive for joint resource usage with similar agents.
Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Games
We contribute to the recent endeavor of investigating residential segregation models with realistic agent behavior by studying Jump Schelling Games with agents having a single-peaked utility function.
Strategic Facility Location with Clients that Minimize Total Waiting Time
Despite that, we prove that subgame perfect equilibria do not exist in all instances of this game and that their existence is NP-hard to decide.
Two-Stage Facility Location Games with Strategic Clients and Facilities
Facility agents selfishly select a location for opening their facility to maximize the attracted total spending capacity, whereas clients strategically decide how to distribute their spending capacity among the opened facilities in their shopping range.
