no code implementations • 14 Feb 2020 • Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams
Recently, the problem of allocating one resource per agent with initial endowments (house markets) has seen a renewed interest: indeed, while in the domain of strict preferences the Top Trading Cycle algorithm is known to be the only procedure guaranteeing Pareto-optimality, individual rationality, and strategy proofness.
no code implementations • 25 Nov 2019 • Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet
Building on previous work by Parijs (who introduced "unanimous envy") we propose the notion of approval envy: an agent $a_i$ experiences approval envy towards $a_j$ if she is envious of $a_j$, and sufficiently many agents agree that this should be the case, from their own perspectives.
no code implementations • 24 Jun 2019 • Aurélie Beynier, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey, Parham Shams
We prove that in the single-peaked domain every swap-stable allocation is Pareto-optimal, showing the efficiency of the swap dynamics.
no code implementations • 28 Jul 2018 • Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Michel Lemaître, Nicolas Maudet, Simon Rey
This paper investigates these notions, when agents have additive preferences over objects, and unveils surprising connections between them, and with other efficiency and fairness notions.
no code implementations • 9 May 2017 • Leila Amgoud, Elise Bonzon, Marco Correia, Jorge Cruz, Jérôme Delobelle, Sébastien Konieczny, João Leite, Alexis Martin, Nicolas Maudet, Srdjan Vesic
Social abstract argumentation is a principled way to assign values to conflicting (weighted) arguments.
no code implementations • 2 Feb 2016 • Elise Bonzon, Jérôme Delobelle, Sébastien Konieczny, Nicolas Maudet
Argumentation is a process of evaluating and comparing a set of arguments.
no code implementations • 7 Jun 2013 • Jérôme Lang, Nicolas Maudet, Maria Polukarov, Alice Cohen-Hadria
For four candidates, the message is, roughly, that most scoring rules (with the exception of Borda) do not guarantee the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium but that Condorcet-consistent rules, for an odd number of voters, do.